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Abstract 
Cephalus makes only a brief appearance in Plato’s Republic, but his 
conversation with Socrates has generated remarkable disagreement: while some 
think Plato’s portrayal of the rich old metic is largely positive, many, including 
Julia Annas, Peter Steinberger, and Mark Gifford, argue that beneath Plato’s 
superficially sympathetic portrait lies a subtext of condemnation and malice. In 
this paper, I reject the later interpretation, defending Cephalus against two 
common charges: first, that Plato finds Cephalus’ views on the relationship 
between money and virtue morally outrageous, and next, that Plato exploits 
readers’ background knowledge of the historical Cephalus’ tragic fate to employ 
the literary device of tragic irony. To do this, I compare Cephalus’ position with 
one Socrates himself defends in Euthydemus, a dialogue with unmistakable 
connections to the Republic. Pairing Euthydemus with Republic I, I conclude, 
provides insight into Socrates’ moral commitments, while Cephalus’ life 
provides a vivid illustration of their implications. 
 
1. Introduction 
We meet Cephalus, the smiling old businessman whose home is the setting for Plato’s 
Republic, in a moment of tacit but tragic irony. Adorned with a ceremonial wreath, he 
returns from the courtyard after offering a sacrifice to Zeus Herkeios, a deity whose 
function is to protect the home.1 Shortly after Plato’s dialogue takes place, however, 
Cephalus’ home is sacked by the Thirty Tyrants in the oligarchic coup of 404 BCE, his 
fortunes are confiscated, and one of his sons, Polemarchus, is executed. Plato does not 
relate these facts about the historical Cephalus but ancient readers would know the fate of 
Athens’ wealthiest metic (or resident foreigner) and father of the famous speech-writer, 
Lysias. Today most commentators cite Cephalus’ fate as evidence that Plato disapproved 
of him, despite the many compliments Socrates pays his host. In particular, Julia Annas, 
Mark Gifford, and Peter Steinberger—in the most thorough treatment of Cephalus so 
far—all argue that Socrates’ many expressions of admiration are insincere, and they 
allege that Socrates never could endorse Cephalus’ central claim, that money can help a 
person to be just2. In this paper, I will argue to the contrary that the condemnation 
Cephalus has received is unfair. I will argue first that Cephalus’ allegedly anti-Socratic 
view about the utility of money mirrors Socrates’ own views in Euthydemus, a dialogue 
unmistakably linked to the Republic, and next, that we should not interpret Cephalus’ fate 
as a sign of Plato’s disapproval. Pairing Republic I with Euthydemus, I will conclude, 
 
 
1 On identifying the deity to whom Cephalus makes his sacrifice, see Mark Gifford 2001, pp. 61- 
62. 
2   Julia Annas 1981, Mark Gifford 2001, and Peter Steinberger 1996. Cephalus’ critics also 
include Rachel Barney 2001, pp. 209-211. Some who read Plato’s depiction of Cephalus as 
favorable include C.D.C. Reeve 1998, p. 6, Terrence Irwin 1995, p. 170, and most recently, 
Patrick McKee 2008 
SAGP NL East/Philol 2011/12, p. 13 
	  
 
 
reveals to us a richer understanding of Socrates’ moral commitments, while Cephalus’ 
life provides a vivid illustration of their implications. 
 
2. Cephalus on the utility of money: Republic I 328b-331d3 
The setting is familiar: Socrates has “gone down” to the Piraeus, the harbor district and a 
democratic stronghold, to attend Athens’ first festival for the Thracian goddess Bendis. 
On his way back, he is accosted by Polemarchus and a few others who persuade him to 
stay, have dinner, and see more of the celebrations, and so the group makes its way to 
Polemarchus’ home. There, Socrates is welcomed by Polemarchus’ father, Cephalus, a 
wealthy old metic who came to Athens from his native Syracuse to operate a business 
manufacturing shields for Athenian infantrymen during the Peloponnesian War. He talks 
briefly with Socrates about old age and money, but before long the old host politely begs 
off to attend to a sacrifice. 
The exchange between the philosopher and the businessman culminates with 
Cephalus’ controversial claim that money is valuable insofar as it can help a person avoid 
injustice (331b), but that claim comes as the result of much prodding by Socrates, who 
behaves throughout the conversation in his typically rude way. Socrates begins by telling 
Cephalus flatly that he looks very old and wonders aloud how he endures it (328de). In 
response, Cephalus says that although most moan and resent old age because they are no 
longer able to indulge in the pleasures of sex, feasts, and drinking parties, he welcomes it 
as a release from such mad and tyrannical masters (329ac). Age is not the cause of 
happiness or hardship, he reasons, but rather, “the way people live” (ho tropos tōn 
anthrōpōn), whether they are moderate (kosmioi) and content (eukolos) or insatiable and 
disturbed (329d). Incredulous, Socrates next insinuates that Cephalus bears old age well 
not because he is moderate but because he is rich, and he asks his host how he made his 
money—did he inherit it or earn it himself (329e)? When Cephalus explains that he has 
managed to grow moderately a fortune he inherited from his father and that he is content 
to leave as much for his sons (330ab), Socrates inquires finally into the greatest good 
wealth provides. “Wealth,” Cephalus answers, “can do a lot to save us from having to 
cheat or deceive someone against our will…this is how it is most useful to a man of any 
understanding” (331b). Being rich is good, then, because it makes it easier to avoid 
unintentional injustice, while poverty makes living justly hard. 
Hearing this, Socrates next does something surprising: he compliments Cephalus 
on his “fine sentiment,” telling the old man that he speaks very well (legeis pagkalōs) 
(331b).4 This is surprising because it is difficult to rectify Cephalus’ so-called “fine 
sentiment” with Socrates’ frequent admonitions against those who care about money, 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Unless otherwise noted, all passages are from the G.M.A. Grube translation of the Republic and 
the Rosalind Kent Sprague translation of Euthydemus in John Cooper 1997. 
4 Of course, one always has to be careful with Socrates’ compliments, which often are ironic, 
barely disguised insults, or prods to encourage puffed-up interlocutors further down the road to 
refutation. But there is no sign of that here, no overblown exaggeration typical of Socrates’ false 
compliments. Compare, for example, his hyperbolic praises for the sophists Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus in Euthydemus: their wisdom is “marvelous!”, “absolutely omniscient!” (271c), so 
remarkable that Socrates declares “I had never in my life seen such wise men” (303c). 
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power, and reputation.5 Socrates often rejects money as altogether valueless, idealizing 
the philosopher as someone not at all interested in material possessions, and his own way 
of living, deliberately poor, relying on others’ support, is a testament to that ideal. Given 
this, Peter Steinberger thinks Socrates must find Cephalus’ claim about the utility of 
money “outrageous,” despite what Socrates says.6 Calling Cephalus “limited and 
complacent” and “philosophically unreflective,”7 Julia Annas and Mark Gifford agree: 
Cephalus tries to rationalize the importance he attaches to money by associating in his 
own mind the possession of wealth with the possession of virtue. Plato could not have 
respected Cephalus’ position, Annas reasons; instead, he must have felt “contempt for it 
and for the complacency it engenders.” Gifford meanwhile cites Cephalus’ interest in 
money as evidence of an unreflective mind.8 The charge against Cephalus, then, is that 
his view on the utility of money is naïve and, from the perspective of Socrates, morally 
indefensible. Steinberger summarizes the charge: “the case of Socrates makes it highly 
doubtful that material possessions could contribute in any way to living the good life, 
properly understood. The truth is, in fact, rather the reverse. The possession of wealth 
implies a preoccupation with money that inevitably detracts from, rather than abets, the 
pursuit of virtue.”9 
Put in this way, the charge is not fair, however, for of course the mere possession 
of wealth does not inevitably imply a preoccupation with money, as Steinberger writes. A 
person could inherit a large fortune and be uninterested in it, for example, or pursue an 
occupation that happens to be lucrative not because it is lucrative but because she finds it 
meaningful and important. The question to ask is whether there is any evidence for 
thinking Cephalus was in fact preoccupied with making money. In the text of Republic I, 
there is nothing to indicate this is the case, however. Cephalus says that he has had little 
interest over the course of his life in either spending or multiplying his fortunes10  and 
Socrates seems to believe him, for he responds by admitting to Cephalus that he doesn’t 
“seem to love money too much” (330b). Nor is there historical evidence for thinking 
Cephalus lived unjustly. To the contrary, we are told through an oration of Lysias that 
Cephalus and his family were highly regarded throughout Athens and that, in their thirty 
years living there, they had never been involved in any accusations of injustice, either as 
plaintiff or perpetrator.11 So there appears to be no evidence for the charge that Cephalus 
 
 
5 In the Apology, for example, Socrates admonishes his accusers on just these grounds—”are you 
not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, 
while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom and truth, or the best possible state of your 
soul?” (29e)—while later in the Republic he will prevent the rulers of his ideal city, the 
Kallipolis, from owing practically anything (416de). 
6 Peter Steinberger 1996, p. 188l 
7 Julia Annas 1981, p. 19, and Mark Gifford 2001, p. 63. 
8 Again, Julia Annas 1981, p. 19, and Mark Gifford 2001, p. 71. 
9 Peter Steinberger 1996, p. 190, emphasis added. 
10 Cephalus’ characterization of himself as not particularly interested in money is consistent, too, 
with what he has to say about the pleasure of sex, feasts, and drinking parties—he is not much 
interested in them and is not sorry to have put those pleasures in his past (329ad), since it is not 
the satisfaction of carnal desires that matters but, rather, it is “the way people live” (329d). 
11 “We lived in such a way,” Lysias writes, “as to avoid both doing wrong to other people and 
suffering injustice from others ourselves” (Against Eratosthenes 12.4.). In his comprehensive 
study of metics in ancient Athens, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, David Whitehead in fact 
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was preoccupied with money or that his interest in money precluded an interest in living 
justly. Still, even if Cephalus was not fixated on money, and even if he led an outwardly 
just life, the question remains: can Socrates endorse the claim that money actually helps a 
person avoid injustice? 
 
3. Socrates on the utility of money: Euthydemus 278e-282d 
I now am going to argue that Socrates can in fact endorse Cephalus’ claim about the 
utility of money and, to do that, I am going to introduce an argument from Euthydemus— 
a dialogue with unmistakable connections to the Republic12—in which Socrates, like 
Cephalus, argues that money can help a good person to be just. We find Socrates in 
Euthydemus trying to convince a boy named Clinias to pursue philosophy and to “devote 
himself to wisdom and excellence” (278d). He begins by cataloguing a list of goods 
conventionally thought to make life go well, like health and beauty, reputation, power, 
wealth, and also canonical virtues like moderation and wisdom (279ac). After compiling 
his list, Socrates adds what he initially suggests is the greatest good, good fortune 
(eutuchia), but immediately retracts the suggestion and claims instead that if a person is 
wise, good fortune is superfluous. This is so because, as he puts it, “wisdom is good 
fortune (sophia…eutuchia estin)” (279cd). While Clinias at first is shocked by this 
pronouncement, his shock wears off as Socrates explains his meaning. He gives several 
examples of wisdom providing people with what he calls good fortune: wise pilots are 
more fortunate at sea than unskilled pilots, for instance, while wise doctors are more 
fortunate in the practice of medicine than incompetent ones (279e1-280a3). By ‘good 
fortune,’ Socrates means success, so his claim really is that wisdom is, and so guarantees, 
success. Thus he concludes, “in sum, things are like this: whenever a person has wisdom, 
he has no need for good fortune in addition” (280b). 
 
 
 
portrays Cephalus as the moral ideal of a 5th-Century metic, a man with a spotless reputation who 
performed many services for the city (David Whitehead 1977, pp. 58 and 160. 
12  There are two reasons, in particular, for connecting the arguments of Euthydemus and the 
Republic. First, there is in Euthydemus a notorious, out-of-the-blue mention of the dialectikos 
(290c), Plato’s technical term in the Republic for a person possessing the superior art required for 
the philosopher’s ultimate “ascension to reality” (521d). Socrates in Euthydemus neglects to 
explain his meaning, and indeed it is explicable only if we read Euthydemus with background 
knowledge about the philosophical method of dialectic Plato develops in the Republic. The next 
reason emerges from an unexpected transition between two arguments in Euthydemus that are 
supposed to be about the same thing. In the first argument, Socrates claims that the virtue of 
wisdom, sophia, is the one thing that makes an individual’s life go well—I will fare well, for 
example, only if I am wise (278e-282d). In the second, however, he mysteriously and without 
comment seems to change the subject: sophia, the virtue that benefits the individual who 
possesses it, transforms into basilikē technē, the kingly skill a ruler needs to benefit his or her 
subjects (288d-293a)]. That Socrates would change the subject from personal to political virtue is 
baffling until we recall the grounding idea in the Republic that a person can become virtuous only 
in the virtuous state, the Kallipolis. With this idea from the Republic in mind, the transition in 
Euthydemus makes sense: if one wants to become wise, one first must inquire into which kinds of 
political states that make it possible for their citizens to acquire virtue. (Annas briefly explores 
this idea in Julia Annas 1993, pp. 61-2, stressing Socrates’ association of political virtue with the 
art of a king, which most Greeks would find shocking.) 
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Now this argument is problematic, for Socrates’ examples don’t seem to support 
the conclusion he draws: they warrant the claim that wisdom provides more success than 
a person would get without it, but they don’t seem to warrant the conclusion that wisdom 
is success, or even that it guarantees success: no doctor, for example, no matter how wise 
she may be, can successfully cure an incurable patient. If she tries, she will fail.13 The 
argument only makes sense under the assumption that, for Socrates, the outcome of one’s 
action is irrelevant to an assessment of whether the action was successful: a person is 
successful whenever she acts wisely and uses wisely the resources at her disposal, no 
matter the outcome: the wise doctor, for instance, who does all she can for the incurable 
patient and who knows the patient’s fate is beyond her control practices her art 
successfully: whether or not she cures the patient has nothing to do with whether or not 
she succeeds as a doctor. Similarly, a pilot who does everything he can to save his ship 
from  a  storm  but  whose  ship  goes  down  because  the  storm  was  unpredictable  and 
unbeatable is no failure, nor is he unfortunate, not if he responds to his situation with 
wisdom and skill. It is not unreasonable to make this assumption, about Socrates’ 
understanding of success either, given his frequent claim that the only object of concern 
is the state of one’s soul and the rightness of one’s actions.14 
That Socrates has this meaning in mind in this passage becomes clear in the next 
step of his argument.15 He next checks to see what his conclusion about wisdom and 
fortune means for his initial catalogue of goods that make a life go well and decides that 
merely possessing a good is not itself beneficial. For a good to benefit a person, a person 
must use it wisely (280ce). An extravagant feast, for example, benefits me only if I want 
it and eat it—just sitting there, it is no benefit at all. Moreover, I must eat wisely—if I am 
dieting and know I cannot control myself around rich foods, the feast harms me. Using 
wisely the  goods  one  has,  then,  is  what  matters;  the  other  goods  Socrates  initially 
catalogued are good only insofar as they make wise action possible and, when not put to 
wise use, they are no good at all. “To sum up,” he concludes, “with respect to all the 
things we called good in the beginning, the correct account is this…if ignorance 
(amathia) controls them, they are greater evils than their opposites, to the extent that they 
are more capable of complying with a bad master; but if wisdom and good sense 
(phronēsis te kai sophia) are in control, they are greater goods. In themselves, however, 
neither sort is of any value” (281de). 
When we apply Socrates’ argument in Euthydemus to the topic of wealth, the 
implications are clear: having money can help a person to act virtuously, so long as the 
person uses his or her money wisely and with good sense: with money, for example, I can 
support and nourish my family, act charitably toward others, and even contribute to the 
betterment of the city. In the same way, I can use reputation and political power to 
positively influence others and promote the right values throughout  my community. 
 
 
13 Because of this, M.A. Stewart, for example, dismisses the argument as “disastrous” (M.A. 
Stewart 1977, p. 22), while T.H. Irwin calls the argument’s apparent faults “recurrent, gross, and 
obvious” (T.H. Irwin 1986, p. 202). 
14 As he famously puts it in the Apology: “a man who is any good at all…should look to this only 
in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or a bad 
man” (28b). 
15 This meaning is of course also consistent, too with Socrates’ frequent claim that the only true 
object of concern is the state of one’s soul and the rightness of one’s actions. See previous note. 
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Wealth, then, can help me to live a just and virtuous life, just as surely as it can help me 
to live a self-indulgent and shallow life—it is a tool that can be put to either virtuous or 
vicious use. Now this parallels Cephalus’ claim about the utility of money in Republic I. 
Reflecting on how wealth has lightened the burdens of old age, he says that it has given 
him peace of mind because he has used it to avoid injustice. Money is valuable when put 
to the service of just aims, like paying debts and dealing honestly with others, but it won’t 
help the wicked because their aims are not just (330d-331b). That is why, Cephalus 
reasons, “a good person wouldn’t easily bear old age if he were poor, but a bad one 
wouldn’t be at peace with himself even if he were wealthy” (330a). 
Cephalus’ claim about the utility of money thus coheres with Socrates’ moral 
views in Euthydemus, and given that, it is reasonable to take Socrates at his word when 
he compliments Cephalus on his “fine sentiment.” This of course does not mean that 
Cephalus’ moral vision is perfect or that Socrates would agree with him on the topic of 
what constitutes wise use. When that question is raised, when Socrates presses Cephalus 
by asking if being honest and paying one’s debts always is just, Polemarchus steps in and 
the old man politely excuses himself, laughing, Plato tells us (331d), so that the younger 
generation can continue the conversation. That Cephalus leaves the conversation early 
sometimes is itself taken to suggest that he is unreflective and that his professed interest 
in virtue is insincere, but it is more charitable to think he simply is being polite, given 
that when Socrates first entered his home, he acknowledged that his visitor had come to 
spend time not with him, but with his sons and the other young guests (328d): “stay with 
these young men now,” he said, “but come regularly to see us, just as you would to 
friends or relatives” (328d). We might have preferred Cephalus to stay and finish the 
conversation, whether doing so is impolite or not, and the fact that he does not stay may 
prove that he is no philosopher, devoted to contemplation and conversation above all else 
But neither does Cephalus represent a “magnificent repudiation” of Socrates’ values, as 
Steinberger claims, nor is there good reason to think Plato’s attitude toward him one of 
malice, as Annas claims16 To the contrary, having neared the end of his life, Cephalus has 
come to ask himself hard questions about what has real value and, although he may not 
fully grasp its implications, his conclusion is one Socrates embraces: the pleasures of sex 
and feasts are distractions in life, justice is what really matters, and money is valuable 
when it helps a person to live justly. 
 
4. Conclusion: Cephalus’ fate. 
There remains a final concern: Cephalus has claimed that wealth has helped him to live 
well and it clearly contributes to the security he feels in his old age and to the flourishing 
of his family, but we know that shortly after the dramatic setting of the Republic, when 
the Thirty Tyrants establish their oligarchic rule after Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian 
War, Cephalus’ household suffers a hideous reversal of fortunes. Steinberger, Annas, and 
Gifford all agree that, once we recall this, we cannot think Plato earnestly endorses 
Cephalus’ claims about money. Instead, the contentment, good cheer, and satisfaction 
Cephalus finds in his wealth mask what Gifford calls a “grisly irony,” the ruin of his 
family.17 In fact, Gifford thinks Plato chooses Cephalus and Polemarchus as Socrates’ 
interlocutors to stage an ironic and pointed demonstration of the dangers of caring too 
 
 
16 Peter Steinberger 1996, p. 189, and Julia Annas 1981, p. 18. 
17 Mark Gifford 2001, p. 83. 
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much about money. Socrates, he reminds us, never investigates a person’s ethical claims 
in isolation. He investigates how those claims match up to how the person lives. Once we 
match Cephalus’ life to his words, Gifford concludes, we must see his wealth as an 
impediment to real virtue.18 
If we recall the lesson of Euthydemus, however—that regardless of outcomes, the 
person who acts wisely and uses justly the resources at her disposal lives well—then we 
need not interpret the injustices committed against Cephalus’ family as a sign that Plato 
believed the rich metic’s values doomed him to failure.19 I would suggest that, when we 
examine the words of Plato’s Cephalus’ in Republic I in light of facts about the historical 
Cephalus and the fate of his family, we find not an ironic portrait of condemnation but 
rather a vivid illustration of how Socratic commitments can alter one’s perspective on 
life, good fortune, and success. Plato offers a choice: if we judge life by conventional 
standards, we see the reversals that befell Cephalus’ household as tragic and ruinous, 
while if we adopt the philosopher’s standards, we see how the love of wisdom protects a 
person from the vicissitudes of fortune. It protects by changing priorities. A wise person 
would not regard the sorts of reversals that befell Cephalus’ household as misfortunes, for 
the only true misfortune is to be possessed of an unjust soul. Whether Cephalus realizes it 
or not, when he claims that the value of money lies in its ability to help a good person 
avoid injustice, he thus introduces an idea that, if taken to its conclusion, can save him 
from tragedy by changing his understanding of what constitutes tragedy. Although he 
makes only a brief appearance in the Republic, Cephalus’ his position in the text as the 
first person Socrates examines signals his significance, for we have in the fate of his 
family and fortunes an illustration of what is at stake when we take seriously Socrates’ 
moral commitments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Ibid., pp. 43-45. 
19  It is instructive to note, too, that Cephalus’ fate parallels that of Socrates. The metic’s family 
was treated brutally and unjustly, and his son Polemarchus was executed; similarly, the 
philosopher was slandered and executed, and he condemned the verdict against him as unjust. 
Socrates, however, notoriously maintained that he was not harmed by the mistreatment  he 
suffered at the hands of his accusers, for there is no harm in being treated unjustly, there is harm 
only in acting unjustly (30d). From Socrates’ perspective in the Apology, too, there is no 
misfortune in suffering the kind of unjust treatment that both he and Cephalus endured. 
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